We examine how competition impacts the provision of product quality. Using inflight amenities provided by U.S. airlines, we find significantly higher product quality (Wi-Fi, entertainment, and power) on more competitive routes. We also examine airline pricing of inflight amenities since these products serve as additional revenue streams for carriers. We find that carriers have lower posted base ticket prices on routes with Wi-Fi and entertainment while offering a la carte pricing for these amenities. The IV price estimates reveal that the magnitude of the posted fare reduction is larger than the additional revenue generated from the inflight amenity.
Introduction
Perhaps no other industry has attracted more academic interest on pricing behavior than the U.S. airline industry. While the number of airline pricing papers are too numerous to exhaustively list, a sampling of this research includes the presence of an airline hub premium (Borenstein 1989 ), higher traffic densities of spokes in a hub-spoke flight network reduce fares (Brueckner et al 1992) , and price discrimination by airlines (Borenstein and (Brueckner et al. 2015) . The bag fee revenue is substantial for U.S. airlines as they collected over $3.5 billion in bag fees in 2014 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics). In this paper we explore additional revenue streams beyond tickets and bag fees, as airlines can collect revenue from inflight Wi-Fi and entertainment offerings. In addition to considering new sources of airline revenue, this study also examines the decision of when firms offer higher product quality.
Previous research has considered a variety of measures for product quality in the airline industry and investigated the link between quality and competition. Using seat density and proportion of business class and first class seats, Rupp and Liu (2016) find improved product quality by network carriers in response to competition from low cost carriers. On the other hand, Prince and Simon (2015) document lower product quality (measured by on-time performance) by the network carrier on routes with low cost carrier competition. Brueckner and Luo (2014) examine the link between quality and competition by estimating flight frequency reaction functions. Berry and Jia (2010) compare consumer behavior in 1999 with 2006 and find that consumers in 2006 have a stronger preference for direct flights. Borenstein and Netz (1999) examine flight departure times and show that monopoly carriers offer greater product differentiation compared to a duopoly route served by the same number of flights.
In this paper, our measure of product quality includes using four different inflight amenities provided by airlines: Wi-Fi, seat size, entertainment, and seat power. Using daily flight level data for over 800 routes and spanning nine weeks in third quarter of 2015 we observe that carriers were actively retrofitting aircraft to expand their inflight amenity offerings. We find significantly lower product quality (Wi-Fi, entertainment, and power) on more concentrated routes. We also find that carriers are lowering the base ticket prices on routes with Wi-Fi and entertainment and then charging passengers to use these amenities. The IV price estimates reveal that magnitude of the fare reduction is larger than the additional revenue generated from the inflight amenity. To our knowledge this paper is the first to extensively examine the Wi-Fi inflight amenity.
Data and Variables
We select the top 500 U.S. domestic nonstop routes based on the number of passengers in 2015. Our fare and flight amenities data come from web scraping an online travel agency which reports both posted airfares and flight amenities for every major U.S. carrier (except Southwest Airlines). We restrict the sample to include the six large domestic carriers (American, Alaska, Delta, JetBlue, US Airways, and United). As a result we observe nonstop flight data for over 1.1 million flights on 419 of the top 500 routes. 1 We treat airport-pair routes as directional so CLT to ORD is a different market than ORD to CLT. As a result we have about 838 directional routes. We collect flight amenities information for departure dates from August 10, 2015 until October 11, 2015, for a total of 9 weeks (63 days). We observe flight amenities offered by the airlines at three points prior to departure for each flight: five weeks, two weeks, and one week in advance of departure. 2 The second data source is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. This is a 10 percent sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. From this DB1B data we observe the number of passengers and are able to calculate the average route level Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI). The sample size of the DB1B data is 1.06 million observations (which is slightly smaller than our flight amenity data).
Each observation in our sample is a collection date -departure date -flight combination. For each observation, we collect the following information: posted prices (not transaction prices), operating carrier, flight number, origination, destination, scheduled departure and arrival time, flight duration, aircraft type, seat type, entertainment options, power, Wi-Fi, along with collection time (hour and minute). Our focus is on the amenity variables which serve as our product quality proxy: seat type (pitch and width), entertainment options, seat power, along with Wi-Fi. 1 We control for the presence of Southwest Airlines on a route by including a dummy variable indicating whether Southwest operates on any specific route. In a different specification we also control for route fixed effects.
2 Note that each flight appears multiple times, differing by the dates when the data are collected.
Empirical Analysis
Airlines are busily retrofitting aircraft, spending millions of dollars doing so in an effort to both increase revenue and offer additional inflight amenities. These retrofitted aircraft typically have thinner seats which allow carriers to increase seat density in the aircraft. In addition to the seating capacity change, the retrofit typically includes adding a Wi-Fi, power outlets, and entertainment options. These are additional sources of airline revenue. Given that retrofitting is an ongoing
process not yet completed, we include weekly controls for each of the nine weeks in which data is collected during the sample.
We expect to find greater Wi-Fi, entertainment, and power proliferation for the later weeks in the sample. We examine four different measures of inflight amenities offered by U.S. airlines on domestic nonstop flights. We construct a discrete measure of each inflight amenity. For example, W if i equals 1 if the flight by carrier i on route j at day t has Wi-Fi and 0 otherwise. 3 Likewise, Entertain equals 1 if the flight has an in-seat entertainment system and 0 otherwise. P ower takes the value 1 for seats that are equipped with power and 0 otherwise. Finally, Seat equals 1 if the seat size has a 31" pitch (or more) and has a "wide" designation, otherwise seat equals 0.
We use the following logit estimation for the four inflight amenity variables:
where y ijt is one of the four inflight amenities previously discussed, c i represents carrier fixed effects, r j represents route fixed effects, X ijt reflects various flight characteristics including duration of flight, departure and arrival times, departure day of the week, and weekly dummies; Z jt includes route competitive measures including an indicator variable (W N ) for the presence of Southwest Airlines on the route, route level HHI, slot restricted is an indicator for slot controlled origin or destination airports (ORD, EWR, LGA, and JFK), tourist is an indicator for Florida or Las Vegas origin or destination airports, and number of passengers. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample. In our nine week sample period in the third quarter of 2015, we track the flight amenities for 1.1 million flights. We find that about 88% of the flights in our sample include Wi-Fi. The typical seat pitch is 31" (42 percent), with a smaller seat pitch of 30" offered in 20 percent of the sample and a roomier seat pitch offered in 38 percent of the sample.
A majority of flights (four of five) offer in-seat entertainment. Power outlets in seats are much less prevalent, occurring in about three of ten flights. Airlines, however, are ramping up the installation of power outlets. The typical domestic flight in our sample of 1.1 million flights has a duration of 166 minutes. In the slightly smaller DB1B sample, however, the flight duration is a bit shorter at 158 minutes. There are very few (about 5% of the sample) involving red eye flights (departures after 2200 hours and before 0500 hours). Route competition is proxied by HHI. The average route level HHI (based on DB1B data) is 0.617. Southwest Airlines (WN) is present on the route in 9% of the sample (this variable does not include the presence of Southwest at adjacent or nearby airports). The competitive interaction term (dura * HHI) multiplies flight duration by route HHI to determine if competitive effects differ by flight duration. In our sample about two of five flights are either to or from a slot controlled airport (DCA, LGA, EWR, or ORD). Table 2 presents results for the four inflight amenities with these estimations including controls for airlines, day of the week, and weekly dummies while excluding route fixed effects (models 1-4). While most aircrafts in our sample are equipped with Wi-Fi, this amenity is not yet universally deployed on every flight. The number of sample observations from DB1B (1,055,173) used in the estimations in Table 2 is slightly less than the 1.1 million observations from the inflight amenity data, hence the regression estimations that include DB1B variables will slightly reduce the sample size.
Excluding Route Controls
First we examine how competitive factors influence the provision of inflight amenities. In an effort to measure actual route competition we calculate the route level Herfindahl index (HHI) using DB1B data which includes 24 domestic carriers in Q3, 2015. Table 2 reveals that more concentrated routes (less competitive) are significantly less likely to have three inflight amenities: W iF i (model 1), Entertain (model 3), and P ower (model 4). We find no relationship between Seat (model 2) and HHI. Carriers can and probably need to differentiate their products on competitive routes (or match their competitors) by offering inflight amenities. Hence these initial results suggest that route level competition may play a role in the carrier's decision to provide an inflight amenity on a particular route.
The interaction term: dura * HHI is found to be positive and significant in both the W if i and Entertain estimations. Given that HHI has the opposite sign, we explore how a one-standard deviation increase (0.242) in HHI from the mean impacts the inflight amenity given the average duration flight of 158 minutes. 4 Interpreting the marginal effects (which appear in brackets on Table  2 ) from model (1) we multiply the HHI change by the marginal effects estimate (0.242*-0.269=-0.065). A one-standard deviation increase in HHI also increases the interaction term dura * HHI by 38.33, hence this amount is multiplied by the marginal effects coefficient (38.33*0.0014=0.053), which provides a net effect of -0.012 for W if i. In sum, a one-standard deviation increase in HHI causes a 1.2% decrease in the likelihood that the flight has the Wi-Fi amenity. Conducting a similar calculation of how a one-standard deviation increase in HHI impacts Entertain based on the marginal effects from model (3) reveals a net effect of 3.4% less likely that the airline will offer in seat entertainment. Likewise, a one-standard deviation increase in HHI also has an estimated 4.4% reduction in the likelihood that an airline will offer in seat P ower based on the marginal effects from model (4).
A second competitive measure that could potentially impact inflight amenities is the presence of Southwest Airlines (W N ). In three of the four estimated models from Table 2 , W N significantly reduces the likelihood that the inflight amenity (W if i, Seat, and Entertain) is provided. We also find P ower is less likely on Southwest routes, however, it does not achieve statistical significance. The marginal effects suggest that W if i is 4.3% less likely, roomier Seat is 14.2% less likely, and Entertain is 7.9% less likely by the six large domestic carriers on routes served by Southwest Airlines. In sum, we find potentially conflicting effects from our two route competition measures as more competitive routes (with lower HHIs) are more likely to offer inflight amenities, while the presence of Southwest Airlines on the route (making the route more competitive) is negatively correlated with the provision of inflight amenities.
Beyond competitive influences, we find additional factors affect a carrier's decision to provide a higher quality product. We find that routes with more passengers are significantly more likely to have W if i, roomier Seat, and P ower. Using DB1B data we observe average route passenger traffic by airline for the quarter and not individual specific airline flights. We also find tourist routes (Florida and Las Vegas origination/destination) are recipients of increased inflight amenities as these routes have significantly more W if i (3.9% more likely), Entertain (15.4% higher), and P ower (4.8% more). In addition, flights to and from slot restricted airports have marginally higher rates of both W if i (1.5% more) and P ower (3.1% higher).
The length of the flight also plays a role in the provision of inflight amenities. Since duration appears twice in each estimation in Table 2 , we have to consider both the direct effect of duration along with the interaction term dura * HHI when determining the influence of flight length on amenities. We find in the W if i estimation both duration terms are statistically significant yet have opposite signs. The net effect, however, suggests that airlines are more likely to offer W if i on longer duration flights. Specifically, the marginal effects from model (1) indicate a flight which is 30 minutes longer (188 minutes) versus the average flight duration in our sample (158 minutes) is 1.4% more likely to offer Wi-Fi. We also find longer duration flights are associated with higher rates of both Entertain and in seat P ower. In these estimations both duration and the interaction term dura * HHI have the same positive sign, yet only one of the duration variables achieves statistical significance. For these estimations a 30 minute increase in flight duration increases the likelihood of Entertain by 3.7% and in-seat P ower by 3.0%, respectively. Finally, we find no link between duration and Seat size.
The time of departure also influences inflight amenities. The variable red eye captures late night departures, (defined as leaving in military time between 22:00 hours and 05:00 hours). During these off hours airlines likely have excess aircraft. Hence carriers which offer additional inflight amenities during these off-peak flight times maybe doing so to either (1) increase demand for the flight due to higher amenities and/or (2) provide additional inflight revenue from consumers who are willing to pay to use W if i or Entertain or larger Seat. On the other hand, if aircraft with these amenities are more costly to operate and the additional revenue does not offset the additional cost, then operating these higher quality aircraft for late night departures reduces an airline's bottom line, in which case we should see fewer red eye flights on aircraft with additional inflight amenities. Table 2 shows that red eye flights are significantly more likely to have W if i, Entertain, and P ower, while less likely to have roomier Seat. These results suggest that during periods of excess capacity carriers opt to deploy aircraft with more inflight amenities. Such findings are consistent with the claim that passengers have higher demand for aircraft with inflight amenities and/or carriers can increase revenue from offering inflight amenities. Specifically, the marginal effects from Table 2 indicate that red eye flights are 2.9% more likely to have W if i, 3.0% more likely to offer Entertain and 6.5% more likely to have P ower. To counter these higher quality offerings for late night departures, we find that roomier Seats are significantly less likely (6.5% lower) for red eye flights.
The final variable included in the estimation is Days ahead which measures the number of days prior to departure that the flight amenity data was collected. Airlines post the type of plane assigned to a particular flight 330 days in advance of departure. Hence this far in advance of departure the carrier is projecting which inflight amenities will be provided based on the expected airplane type. The specific tail number and actual inflight amenities of the aircraft, however, is assigned to the flight about two weeks prior to departure (McCartney, 2016) . Given that airlines in 2015 were constantly retrofitting aircraft, Days ahead determines if there are any systematic changes in the quality of inflight amenities offered prior to departure. For three of the four amenities, there is no link between when the flight amenity data is collected and the likelihood of offering the amenity. The one exception is Entertain as this negative and significant coefficient suggests flight data collected well in advance of departure are less likely to indicate an Entertain offering. One possible explanation consistent with this finding is that retrofitted aircraft with Entertain are now being offered closer to departure. An alternative explanation of this outcome is that a carrier initially intended to assign a non-upgraded aircraft to the flight and then switched to an upgraded aircraft at the last minute. While the weekly indicator variables are suppressed from the output in Table 2 , we note that the marginal effect for the final week in our sample (week9) is 4.8% more likely to have Entertain compared to the first week.
Every estimation on Table 2 includes weekly dummy variables along with controls for each day of the week while omitting Saturday. The number of flights in our sample is not uniformly dispersed during the seven days of the week. The lightest aircraft utilization days occur on the weekend with Saturday and Sunday comprising 11.1% and 13.5% of the sample, respectively. In comparison, the mid-week days comprise a larger proportion of the sample, ranging from 14.4% to 16.5%. Somewhat surprisingly is that Saturday, which is the day of the week when carriers have the lightest aircraft utilization rates and hence have the most flexibility to deploy Wi-Fi aircraft, we find significantly higher W if i utilization rates for every other day of the week when compared to Saturday. The marginal effect suggests that each day of the week has about a 1% higher probability of having Wi-Fi compared to Saturday flights. One possible explanation for this result is that airlines are using Wi-Fi aircraft more prominently when business travelers are flying (between Monday and Friday). On the other hand, P ower is significantly less likely on each day of the week compared to Saturday.
Finally, all estimations include controls for each carrier. The coefficients for the carrier and weekly dummies are not reported in the tables. The results show that flight amenity data collected in the later weeks are significantly more likely to have W if i, Entertain, and P ower, but for only the final week of the sample collection period (week9) do we observe any significant difference in Seat. Combined, these finding suggests that carriers were adding flight amenities throughout the nine week data collection period, and in the final week of the sample the retrofitted aircraft were less likely to have roomier seats in the third quarter of 2015.
Including Route Controls
Next we employ route level fixed effects in our flight amenities estimations (see Table 3 ). 5 Since many of the previously discussed explanatory variables don't vary within the route, they are dropped from the route level fixed effects estimation. In particular, the following route variables are now excluded from the estimations in Table 3 : HHI, dura * HHI, W N , tourist, passengers, and slot restricted. In addition, routes that have no variation in the flight amenity variable are also dropped from the sample. As a result the number of observations drops by between 15% (P ower) to 45% (W if i). We find that departure time, flight duration, and when the data are collected all have some influence on the provision of inflight amenities. Table 3 shows that carriers are 5.5% and 4.1% significantly more likely to offer both W if i and P ower, respectively on red eye departures. We find no link between red eye departures and either Seat size or Entertain after controlling for route effects.
Upon including route fixed effects, flight duration has a significant influence on three of the four flight amenity variables. In these fixed effects estimations, the identification of duration comes from variation in scheduled flight block times on the same route. Carriers vary the scheduled flight duration time for two reasons: (1) aircraft employed on the route and (2) expected congestion at peak travel times (early evening) which require longer travel times. The results from Table 3 show longer duration flights are associated with roomier Seat, yet have lower rates of Entertain and P ower. The marginal effects suggest a 10 minute increase in flight duration (from the average travel time for the route) is associated with a 3.4% increase in a roomier Seat, a 8.1% reduction in Entertain, and a 3.8% lower likelihood of P ower. We find no relationship between duration and the provision of W if i.
Data collected further in advance to departure (Days ahead) is less likely to indicate Entertain and is marginally more likely to have a roomier Seat and P ower. Some of these trends also are exhibited in the weekly dummy variables as the later weeks in the sample (which are not reported in Table 3 ) are significantly more likely to offer W if i, Entertain, P ower, while being less likely to have roomier Seat. These changes reflect ongoing retrofitting of aircraft during the sample period with carriers shrinking the seat pitch. Finally, we find significantly higher rates of both W if i and Entertain for each day of the week compared to Saturday.
Ordered Logits -Seat and Entertainment
The previous section categorized each flight amenity as a binary variable (i.e., 0 or 1). Since airlines offer a wider range of quality for some flight amenity variables than a 0 or 1 designation, we created three categories of seat spaciousness and entertainment options. The variable o seat is an ordered seat offering with three different values from least to most desirable: 0 if the aircraft seating arrangement is considered "compact" (seats with less than 31" pitch), 1 if the aircraft seating arrangement is "standard" (industry standard 31" pitch) and 2 if the aircraft seat has either additional width or additional legroom compared to the 31" "regular" seat. The distribution of the 1.12 million flights in the sample among these three quality categories for seats: "compact" 223,647 (20%), "standard" 467,769 (42%), and "roomier" 425,457 (38%). Because the dependent variable o seat takes on three different values with the larger values associated with better consumer outcomes, we use an ordered logit regression.
In a similar fashion we create three quality categories for inflight entertainment. The variable o entertain is an ordered entertainment offering with three different values from least to most desirable: 0 if the aircraft does not offer entertainment, 1 if the aircraft has entertainment for purchase, and 2 if the aircraft offers free entertainment. The distribution of entertainment offerings in our sample is: no entertainment 224,821 (20%), entertainment for purchase 727,008 (65%), and free entertainment 165,154 (15%). Table 4 presents ordered logit results for o seat and o entertain where the estimations both include and exclude route fixed effects. Many of the ordered logit results are quite similar to the previous reported logit findings from Table 2 and 3. Once again we find fewer flight amenities on less competitive routes. Starting with the estimations that exclude route fixed effects the quality of entertainment suffers on less competitive routes. Specifically, routes with higher HHI are significantly less likely to have entertainment offerings (see model 11). The interaction term dura * HHI, however, has a positive coefficient in model (11) which partly offsets the effect of a negative HHI coefficient.
In addition, an alternative measure of route competition is the presence of Southwest Airlines on the route is also associated with lower quality amenities. We find that on routes where W N is present, it is significantly less likely to have both roomier seats and entertainment (models 9 and 11). Slot restricted airports are significantly more likely to offer larger seats (model 9), yet significantly less likely to provide entertainment (model 11). Also, routes with increased passengers have significantly higher quality seats (model 9). Finally, tourist routes are associated with better entertainment offerings (model 11).
Turning to the results that include route fixed effects in Table 4 we find longer duration flights are significantly less likely to provide either complimentary inflight entertainment or entertainment for a fee (model 12). We find no relationship between red eye flights and either ordered seat or ordered entertainment offerings. Flight amenity data collected more days ahead of departure is less likely to show higher quality seat offerings and improved entertainment offerings. We collect data over a nine-week period and find a significant monotonic increase in entertainment offerings for flight data collected later in the sample.
HHI Quartile Regressions
To further explore the link between route competition and flight amenities, we divide the sample into three groups based on HHI quartiles. Table 5 presents estimations for the most competitive (least concentrated) routes which are in the bottom 25 percent quartile (model 13) and have an HHI below 0.4262. The estimation results for the middle half of the HHI distribution which lies between 0.4262 and 0.8571 appear in model (14) . Finally, the least competitive (most concentrated) routes have an HHI that lies in the top quartile which corresponds to an HHI above 0.8571, with the results appearing in model (15) . These estimations include route fixed effects controls hence all of the route invariant variables are omitted.
Carriers can gain a quality advantage on their competitors by offering Wi-Fi when their rivals do not. We find that carriers are more likely to indicate the provision of Wi-Fi on competitive routes as Table 5 shows that days ahead has a positive coefficient. This result suggests that on the most competitive routes (bottom 25 percent HHI quartile) carriers are significantly more likely to indicate the provision of W if i in advance of departure. On the other hand, for the least competitive routes (top quartile of HHI) in advance of departure carriers are significantly less likely (marginal significance level) to indicate the provision of W if i. We find no relationship between W if i and days ahead for the middle HHI quartile.
Route competition provides some effect on the remaining variables. For example, red eye departures are significantly more likely to have W if i for both the bottom and top quartiles. We do find, however, a larger marginal effect for the most competitive routes as red eye flights are 2.1% more likely to have W if i and just 0.3% more likely for the least competitive quartile. We find little difference for flight duration between the route competition quartiles.
Price Regression
In this section, we analyze how airlines' inflight amenities affect the posted prices of airline tickets.
Price: OLS results
The OLS price results are presented in Table 6 . In each price estimation we examine the influence of the four inflight amenities (W if i, Entertain, P ower, and Seat) while controlling for airline, week and route fixed effects. Relative to a flight without W if i, a flight with W if i has a lower baseline posted price by $9.74 on average, holding everything else the same. This result suggests that similar to the bag-fee offset to the lower fare (see Brueckner et al. (2015) ), carriers are offering a lower baseline posted ticket price and allowing customers to purchase Wi-Fi at an additional cost. Hence the provision of Wi-Fi has the potential to be a revenue positive event for the airline if a sufficient number of passengers pay for this service. To determine the break-even revenue point of providing W if i for the airline we observe that most U.S. airlines charge $16 for a one day Wi-Fi pass on domestic flights (or $5 per hour). The airline would need a slight majority about 60 percent) of passengers to buy the one day Wi-Fi pass to offset the $9.74 lower average posted fare.
Similarly, we find that Entertain also lowers the base posted ticket price by about $5.60. Entertainment offerings are free on some flights, but must be paid for on other flights. For example, United Airlines offers DIRECTV to its economy passengers at a cost of $5.99 and $7.99 for domestic flights under two hours and over two hours, respectively. Hence United would need nearly every passenger on a short flight and a large majority (70 percent) on a longer domestic flight to purchase DIRECTV to offset the $5.60 lower posted base fare.
In contrast, we find slightly higher average posted ticket prices ($0.94) on aircraft with P ower. Since airlines do not charge for P ower there is no additional revenue stream from providing this good. Hence if the airline wishes to recoup the cost of installing seat power than it must raise airline ticket prices. For our final flight amenity variable seat, we find that base posted ticket price does not depend on the seat configuration of the aircraft. Recall that our flight data observes the lowest posted ticket price for the flight, hence we find no relationship between posted prices and seat size.
Moving beyond the inflight amenities variables, we find that posted fares for red eye flights are about $20 lower. In comparison to Saturday, we find significantly higher posted fares on Sunday and Monday, which are $36 and $30 higher, respectively. The lowest posted fares occur on Wednesdays as these are $11 less than Saturdays. These results are robust across the models. On the same carrier-route combination, different flights may have different durations due to variations on airport congestion and aircrafts employed across flights. We find that flights with longer duration command higher prices -a one minute increase of duration raises the base fare by about $0.30. We also find that advance purchase leads to lower posted base prices -about $3.63 lower for each additional day in advance. 6 
Price: IV results
The OLS price regressions do not take into account that carriers choose both inflight amenities and ticket prices. There may also be an omitted variables problem. For example, there may be confounding factors beyond our explanatory variables, and these factors may also vary within a carrier or a route and thus are uncontrolled for by the carrier and route fixed effects. As a result, the amenity variables could be correlated with the error terms, making inflight amenity variables in the price regressions endogenous. We perform Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to check for such a possibility, with the null hypothesis being that the amenity variable is exogenous. Our tests reject that null hypothesis for Seat and Entertainment, but fail to reject the null for W if i and P ower. To deal with the endogeneity issue, we implement an instrumental variable (IV) estimation method.
Construction of the IVs
Finding a proper external instrument set is often not easy. Commonly employed IVs in the IO literature are cost shifters and average characteristics of products in other markets. Unfortunately, these IVs will likely violate the condition that the IV must have an indirect impact on the dependent variable instead of a direct impact. In the absence of external IVs, we construct Lewbel (2012) instruments by exploiting the higher moments of the data.
The identification strategy of the Lewbel method heavily relies on several assumptions. Suppose that the endogeneity is caused by an omitted variable u so that the error term has the form e = α · u + v. The first assumption involves the exogeneity of the independent variables vector X (which does not include the amenity variable), i.e., E(X ·e) = 0. This implies that X is uncorrelated with both the omitted variable u and the idiosyncratic error v. Next, letX be a sub-vector of X. Assume theX is uncorrelated with u 2 , v i v j and uv i , i = j; and Cov(X, v 2 ) = 0. Combined, these assumptions allow the following conditions to be satisfied: (1) E(X · e) = 0; (2) cov(X, e i · e j ) = 0, i = j and (3) σ 2 i = σ 2 (i.e., the error terms e are heteroskedastic). 7 These conditions allow us to construct the vector of instruments described next.
The Lewbel instruments are constructed as follows. For each inflight amenity variable (e.g., W if i), in the first stage of 2SLS, we regress the amenity variable on the exogenous subvector X. 8 Lettingε denote the residuals. We then use the residuals to interact with the mean-centered exogenous variables (i.e.X −E(X)) to obtain our instruments Z. Suppose that there are K variables inX, i.e.,X = (x 1 , · · · ,x k , · · · ,x K ). For each exogenous variablex k , we create an instrument z k as follows:
Note that we construct a total of 4 sets of instruments, one for each of the 4 amenity variables. 9 In the second stage, we use Z = (z 1 , · · · , z k , · · · z K ) as instruments to regress the dependent variable (price, or average one-way posted domestic fare) on the exogenous variables X and the amenity variable.
This generated Lewbel instrumental variable technique can be applied to other settings where external instruments are unavailable. This is in the same spirit as Arellano and Bond (1991) which uses lagged endogenous variables as IVs. 10 
IV results
The IV results are presented in Table 7 . Once again, we find significantly lower baseline posted prices for aircraft that provide Wi-Fi and Entertainment. The magnitude of these coefficient estimates has increased substantially as we find the presence of W if i significantly lowers the base posted price of the airline ticket by $27 while Entertain reduces ticket prices by $21. This ticket price reduction clearly exceeds the daily potential revenue from W if i since carriers charge just $16 for a one-day Wi-Fi access pass. Even if every passenger pays for Wi-Fi, this extra revenue won't be enough to compensate the loss of base ticket prices.
We believe the following thought experiment may provide some insights on this puzzle. Recall that the U.S. airline industry is replete with price discrimination. Before the airlines began offering Wi-Fi and entertainment inflight amenities, to segment travelers airlines have relied on restrictions 7 Condition (3) -the scale heteroscedasticity related to X -is confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test. 8 We use the whole set of exogenous variables, i.e.,X = X. We also tried different subsets of the exogenous variables in constructing the generated IVs and ran the same regressions as robustness checks. The results are qualitatively the same. 9 We perform under-identification test (KP LM test), over-identification test (Hansen J test) and weak IV tests (Cragg-Donald Wald F test and Stock-Yogo test) for each of the 4 sets of instruments. The Lewbel instruments pass most but not all of these tests. 10 Obviously using lagged values requires a panel data. In contrast, the Lewbel (2012) approach works well for cross sectional data. The tradeoff is that the Lewbel approach requires the heteroscedasticity of the idiosyncratic errors.
such as advance purchase, Saturday night stay over, ticket refundability and so on. Whether a passenger pays for inflight amenities provide a much more direct measure to infer consumer type and willingness to pay. So the baseline ticket price is for a more refined group of passengers with the lowest willingness to pay. Since the lowest consumer group is more refined, one would expect that ticket price to drop further. Given that our pricing data selects the lowest posted coach fare, we don't observe higher quality offerings such as United's Economy Plus. Our conjecture is that better refinement of travelers, while reduces the fare for the lowest group, raises the fare for higher consumer groups. That is, one would expect more expensive upgrades from standard United Economy to, say, Economy Plus. Also, a Honeywell Aerospace survey reveals growing demand for Wi-Fi by travelers with 17% indicating that they have switched from a "preferred" airline to another carrier that offered greater likelihood of having Wi-Fi on the flight (Rabinowitz 2014) , carriers maybe willing to lose a few dollars on W if i in order to retain passengers.
For the other two flight amenity variables, neither P ower nor Seat provide any significant explanatory power of the base airline ticket price. This is a change from the OLS estimates as P ower was previously found to be associated with slightly higher ($0.94) posted ticket prices.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the research question of when do firms offer higher product quality. We address this question in the context of the airline industry. Specifically, we examine how airlines allocate inflight amenities. Tracking four different measures of amenities -Wi-Fi, entertainment, seat size, and power, we find that on more concentrated routes carriers are significantly less likely to offer Wi-Fi, entertainment, and power. In addition, we find that carriers are significantly more likely to indicate the provision of inflight Wi-Fi further in advance of departure on the most competitive routes (lowest HHI quartile). While on the least competitive routes (highest HHI quartile) carriers are less likely to indicate that Wi-Fi is being provided the more days in advance to departure.
Our examination of how inflight amenities impact posted airline fares reveals that carriers are lowering base ticket prices on flights that offer Wi-Fi and entertainment. The IV price estimates reveal that magnitude of the posted fare reduction is larger than the additional revenue generated from the inflight amenity. The airlines may be opting to lose money on these inflight amenities in order to keep passengers from switching to a competitor. 
